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ABSTRACT  
   
The controversy over law enforcement use of TASER devices and the potential 
for the devices to cause death has proliferated in recent years. In 2005 the Police 
Executive Research Forum (PERF) and International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP) 
published national-level policy guidelines for the use of TASER devices, with one of the 
goals being to reduce the occurrence of deaths proximal to their use. What remains 
unknown in regard to these guidelines is whether or not departments that adhere to 
these guidelines are experiencing fewer TASER-proximate arrest related deaths (ARDs) 
than departments who are not. This study seeks to determine preliminary answers to this 
question by conducting a comparison of the policies of departments with three or more 
TASER-proximate ARDs to a matched sample of police departments that deploy the 
TASER, but have no (or one to two) TASER-proximate ARDs. The departments were 
matched on the number of full time sworn officers, geography (region, division, or state), 
and department type. Once matched, all department policies were coded based on how 
closely they adhered to the following areas of PERF and IACP guidelines: use of force 
against vulnerable/at risk populations, policies governing the TASER device deployment, 
training, reporting, and post-exposure requirements.  
 Study departments, when compared to matched departments, had a greater 
number of policy areas with higher failure to comply rates. The same was true when 
looking at the category totals, as well as the overall totals, with the difference in failure 
to comply rates being larger for PERF than IACP. These findings show an association 
between departments with three or more TASER-proximate ARDs and higher failure to 
comply rates with national model policies. Additionally, it appears that many departments 
are failing to heed research findings or advice from outside their department. Based on 
this, future research may want to address the ways in which greater compliance with 
national policies can be obtained nationwide.  
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
Problem 
In the seven-year period between January 2003 and December 2009 the Bureau 
of Justice Statistics reported 4,700 arrest related deaths (ARDs) (BJS, 2011).  The 
controversy and devastating effects of police citizen encounters that result in death are 
not a new phenomenon and have been documented in prior research (see White et al, 
2012). These deaths have traditionally and predominately been the result of firearms; in 
fact, of the 4,700 ARDs reported during that time, 2,684 (57%) involved an officer killing 
a citizen with a firearm (BJS, 2011). However, with changing and advancing technology 
there has been a rise in ARDs that involve the use of Conducted Electrical Weapons 
(CEW), in particular the TASER device (White et al 2012).  For example, during an eight-
year period from January 2001 through December 2008, White et al. (2012) identified 
392 ARDs that involved the use of a TASER. Importantly, the annual number of TASER-
proximate1 ARDs increased substantially during that time. In 2001 there were only three 
TASER-proximate ARDs, in 2002 there were 14, in 2003 there were 17. The years of 
2004 through 2006 showed the most dramatic increases; in 2004 there were 50 TASER-
proximate ARDs, 74 in 2005, and 87 in 2006. These numbers then decreased slightly in 
2007 and 2008 (76 and 71, respectively).  
Prior research on TASER-proximate ARDs has focused on the incident and 
suspect characteristics of the ARD and has not sufficiently explored the role of 
department level characteristics (White et al., 2012; White & Ready, 2009). White and 
Ready (2009) looked at both death and non-death cases where the TASER was used 
                                               
1 TASER-proximate is the term used by White et al. (2012) use to describe arrest 
related deaths that occurred following TASER device use. There is no causality 
implied in this term. 
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during a police incident. They found several significant predictors of death, including: 
resistance after TASER device use, as well as mental illness and drug use (White & 
Ready, 2009). Additionally, Thomas, Collins, and Lovrich (2010 and 2011), Alpert and 
Dunham (2010), and Alpert, Smith, Kaminski, Fridell, MacDonald, and Kubu (2011) have 
explored departmental policies regarding TASER use generally, but prior research has not 
sufficiently addressed the impact of departmental policies on TASER-proximate ARDs. In 
2005 PERF and IACP published national-level policy guidelines for the use of TASERs, 
with one of the goals being to reduce the occurrence of deaths proximal to their 
deployment. What remains unknown in regard to these guidelines is whether or not 
departments that adhere to these guidelines are experiencing fewer TASER-proximate 
ARDs than departments who are not. This study seeks preliminary answers to this 
question by conducting a comparison of the policies of departments that have 
experienced multiple TASER-proximate ARDs to the policies of departments who have not 
experienced such events. 
By understanding the effect that administrative policies have on the manner and 
circumstances in which a TASER is deployed, departments may be able to develop their 
policies in such a way as to reduce the chances of TASER-proximate ARDs occurring. For 
example, if findings show that departments with policies limiting multiple deployments of 
the device against a suspect are more likely to have no TASER-proximate ARDs and 
departments without this limitation in their policy have more TASER-proximate ARDs, this 
would provide support for the inclusion of guidelines limiting the number of deployments 
in departmental policies.  
Current Study 
Between January 2001 and December 2008, there were 297 departments in the 
United States that experienced at least one TASER-proximate ARD (White et al., 2012). 
Of the 297 departments who experienced at least one TASER-proximate ARD, 17 
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experienced three or more TASER-proximate ARDs, accounting for a total of 66 deaths, 
or 22 percent of the total number of TASER-proximate ARDs. The disparity in number of 
TASER-proximate ARDs over the eight-year period for departments across America lead 
the author to question why some departments have three or more TASER-proximate 
ARDs while other departments of like size and geography have no TASER-proximate 
ARDs (or only one to two).  
In order to determine whether policy differences exist between departments, as 
well as their association on TASER-proximate ARDs, I will compare the policies of 
departments with three or more TASER-proximate ARDs to a matched sample of police 
departments that deploy the TASER, but have zero to two TASER-proximate ARDs.2 All 
departments will also be compared to PERF and IACP model policy guidelines. The 
departments will be matched on the number of full time sworn officers, as well as the 
geography down to the lowest measure of aggregation possible (region, division, state), 
and department type (sheriff or local police). This matching of departments based on 
department size, geography, and department type allows for reasonable comparisons to 
be made among similarly situated departments. Additionally, by controlling for 
department size, the methodology will roughly account for important departmental 
features such as budget, training capacity, and resources.  
  
                                               
2 There are three cases where the only suitable matched department experienced 
two TASER-proximate ARDs. In two of these cases their study department 
experienced six TASER-proximate ARDs, and in the last case the study department 
experienced five TASER-proximate ARDs. In these cases there were no other suitable 
matches due to the size of the department.  
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Research Questions 
 The two research questions examined in this study are as follows: 
1. Is there an association between the prevalence of TASER-proximate ARDs 
experienced by police departments and the degree to which agencies adhere 
to national guidelines articulated by PERF and IACP?  
2. Amongst the 133 law enforcement agencies in this study with 3 or more 
TASER-proximate ARDs, are there policy changes that could potentially alter 
the nature of suspect-officer interactions that involve the use of a TASER 
device, and reduce the likelihood for TASER-proximate ARDs?  
Implications 
By comparing policy differences between matched departments with no (or one 
to two) TASER ARDs and those with multiple TASER ARDs departments, I intend to 
explore whether administrative policies have the potential to minimize the risk of TASER-
proximate ARDs. The assessment of administrative policies will be conducted by 
comparing the policies of the departments with 3 or more TASER-proximate ARDs with 
their matched departments, with specific attention being paid to how each department’s 
policy differs from national-level model policies delineated by PERF and the IACP. The 
policy areas that will be explored include: use of force against vulnerable/at risk 
populations (children, elderly, medically infirm, pregnant, etc.), policies governing the 
TASER device deployment (necessary suspect resistance level, device mode, number of 
activations, and length of deployment, when and where not to use), training, reporting, 
and post-exposure requirements (restraint and medical attention).  An understanding of 
how administrative policy can influence the nature and frequency of TASER-proximate 
                                               
3 There were 17 departments with three or more TASER-proximate ARDs; however, 
four of these departments were not included in the study due to lack of a suitable 
match. This is discussed in further detail in the methodology.  
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ARDs may enable departments to make more informed policy decisions and minimize the 
potential for these TASER-proximate ARDs to occur. This knowledge base will become 
increasingly important as the use of this device grows.  
  6 
Chapter 2 
Prior Research 
The literature involving TASER devices4 — also referred to as conducted electrical 
weapons (CEWs) or electronic control devices (ECDs) more generally — has proliferated 
since the mid-2000s as the technology became increasingly popular and also came under 
strong scrutiny from Amnesty International regarding its safety (see Amnesty 
International, 2004). In order to understand the controversy surrounding the TASER 
device and the policy guidelines that have been developed to increase the safe 
implementation of the device, the literature that follows will be broken down into several 
key areas. The first section will briefly discuss the importance of use of force in police 
citizen interactions, as well as the prevalence of force used by law enforcement. The 
second section will include a brief history of the TASER, followed by a description of how 
the device functions, as well as available evidence on how frequently TASER-proximate 
ARDs occur. The third section will review three general areas that have generated 
controversy surrounding TASER deployment: questions involving use (when, against 
who, and for how long the device is used); questions involving the effectiveness of the 
device; and questions involving the physiological risks of the device. The last section 
describes the national policy guidelines published by the Police Executive Research 
Forum (PERF) and the International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP); the literature 
on the impact of administrative policy on other areas of police field behavior; and the 
available evidence on administrative policies regulating TASER use.  
General Use of Force 
The importance of the use of force was articulated by Bittner (1970), where he 
states that in order to be perceived in the proper manner by the public during police-
                                               
4 The terms CEW and ECD are used interchangeably with TASER, as TASER 
International is the industry leader.  
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citizen encounters, the police need to be able to project the need for, threat of, and 
actual use of force in order to achieve their objectives. In short, Bittner states that the 
authority to use force is the core of the police role. However, the overall prevalence of 
instances where force is used is relatively low (see Travis et al., 1999). In 2008 there 
were roughly 40 million police citizen encounters; of those approximately 1.4 percent 
involved the use-of-force or threats of force (Bureau of Justice Statistics, 2011). Because 
of the volume of encounters, 1.4 percent translates into 560,000 applications of force per 
year and 1,534 per day. It is important to note that police use of force typically occurs at 
the lower end of the force continuum (i.e. “grabbing, pushing, or shoving”), when a 
subject is resisting an arrest, and with suspects who are under the influence of drugs or 
alcohol, or who are mentally ill (Travis et al., 1999: 4). Alpert and Dunham (2010) note 
that injuries to officers in use of force cases occurred in 10 to 38 percent of the incidents 
under examination in their research.  
While use of force can be seen as a relatively rare occurrence, arrest related 
deaths are even more rare. Between January 2003 and December 2009, BJS reports a 
total of 4,813 arrest related deaths; in 45 percent of these cases the suspect was 
engaged in assaultive behavior immediately prior to or during the arrest (BJS, 2011). 
Causes of death during these arrests included: homicides (by law enforcement and other 
persons), intoxication, accidental injuries, suicides, and natural causes (BJS, 2011).  
The Emergence of the TASER 
 
History. CEWs had their genesis when Jack Cover, an aerospace engineer, 
designed a nonlethal CEW to incapacitate airline “skyjackers” in the 1970s as an 
alternative to the .38 caliber revolver (Meyer, 2009). The problem for law enforcement 
agencies has been a bit different; they have been faced with individuals who are under 
the influence of drugs—such as cocaine, methamphetamine, or PCP— and these 
individuals are often extremely difficult to subdue while under the influence of such 
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drugs. Police have been left with essentially two methods to deal with these suspects. 
Traditionally, they either used potentially lethal force with a firearm and kept their 
distance from the subject, or they used weapons such as batons, neck restraints, and 
handcuffs all of which place the officer in close contact with the subject and leave them 
vulnerable to injuries (Meyer, 2009).  
TASER, which stands for Thomas A Swift Electric Rifle, was incorporated in 
September 1993. However, in 1981 the LAPD first began using the original 7-watt TASER 
developed by Cover (Stratbucker, 2009). This weapon was later found to be ineffective 
against some suspects (Meyer, 2009). In December of 1999 TASER International 
released the first neuromuscular incapacitation device (the M-series), and in May 2003 
the X26 model was launched (TASER, 2012). The two latter devices have proven to be 
effective in subduing highly resistant subjects and have become extremely popular 
among law enforcement agencies in the United States.5  
How the TASER Works. The TASER has a physical form that is quite similar to 
a handgun. There are two modes that the TASER can be used in, probe mode and drive 
stun, with the former being far more common. When used in probe mode the device 
uses compressed nitrogen to deploy two probes that are attached to wire leads. The 
range of the device is anywhere from 15 to 35 feet, depending on the cartridge being 
used. When the trigger is pulled deploying the probes, the device emits a high voltage 
(5,000+ V) low current of electricity for five seconds (see TASER, 2012). The weapon 
causes the incapacitation of the subject through “intense involuntary contractions of 
skeletal muscle, causing subjects to lose the ability to directly control the actions of their 
voluntary muscles” (Vilke and Chan, 2007, p 349). When used in the probe mode the 
device is designed to incapacitate a subject regardless of their “mental focus, training, 
                                               
5 Two other models have been released after the study period that is used in this 
analysis, the X3 in July of 2009 and the X2 in April of 2011 (TASER, 2012).  
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size, or drug intoxication state” by overriding their central nervous system (Vilke and 
Chan, 2007: 349); whereas the drive stun mode of the TASER device is used for pain 
compliance. In the drive stun mode the device is pressed directly onto the subject and 
emits a localized current of electricity, at the same voltage as in probe mode. The 
incapacitation effects from a TASER device vary depending on the mode, duration of use 
and the placement of the probes. For example, the greater the distance between the 
probes the farther the current travels through the subject’s body. Fish and Geddes 
(2001) report that the effects from the device can outlast the duration; as the subject 
may be left feeling dazed and weak for a few minutes following the deployment.  Vilke 
and Chan (2007: 349) argue to the contrary, stating that subjects should be able to 
function at “their physical baseline” once the deployment ceases.  
Current Statistics on Police Department TASER Usage. Figures from 
TASER International (2011) show that roughly 559,000 TASER CEWs have been sold to 
over 16,300 law enforcement, private security, and military agencies in 107 countries, 
with 7,000 agencies issuing the device to all of their patrol officers. Within the United 
States there are 15,500 departments that have purchased a TASER device and 370,000 
devices have been issued to officers nationwide (TASER International, 2011). As of 
August 2011, TASER International reports that worldwide, there have been 
approximately 1.4 million field deployments of their device on a suspect. According to 
BJS, the number of police citizen encounters involving a TASER device in 2008 was 
9,700; however, they state this number needs to be interpreted with caution (BJS, 
2011). Brewer and Kroll (2009) found a total of 22,160 field deployments across 118 
agencies from 1986 to 2008. They also found that those agencies with fewer authorized 
users had higher usage rates per device, with an average of one deployment per device 
every two years (Brewer and Kroll, 2009). These numbers differ greatly as, with the 
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exception of the numbers from TASER International, the various studies are looking at 
different select populations over specific time frames.  
The Controversies Surrounding TASER Devices 
  
The use of the TASER has generated some controversy. In particular, Amnesty 
International (2004) called for a moratorium on the use of TASERs and like devices, 
citing concerns over their use and safety. White and Ready (2007, 2010) have identified 
three separate areas of controversy involving police use of the TASER. Each is described 
below.  
Controversy #1: Policy Questions on Use. 
Passive resistance. Amnesty International (2004) questions whether or not the 
device is being used appropriately (i.e. an appropriate response to the level or resistance 
presented), and these concerns are echoed by Alpert and Dunham (2010). Amnesty 
International (2007) found that of the 291 death cases they reviewed, the subjects were 
only armed in 25 of the cases, and none were armed with firearms. Alpert and Dunham 
(2010) find there is no consistency with the placement of the devices on the use of force 
continuum (see also GAO, 2005). Specifically, Alpert and Dunham (2010) found that 
twenty-four percent placed the device as a low-level force option; sixty-four percent as a 
mid-level force option; and ten percent as a high-level force option; Thomas et al. (2010) 
also found that most departments placed it as a mid-range force option.  
Misuse of the TASER. Amnesty International (2007) raised concerns about the 
potential abuse of TASER devices when used in the drive stun mode as a method of pain 
compliance, particularly when suspects are already in custody. Alpert and Dunham 
(2010) find that the ease of use that TASERs provide places them at a higher risk for 
abuse; they also note that this can be combatted by implementing policies that clearly 
dictate when and how the device can and cannot be used. Specifically, they argue that 
the device should only be used against active resisters, and that officers should take into 
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account the entire situation and characteristics of the subject before deploying the device 
(Alpert and Dunham, 2010).  
Vulnerable populations. Amnesty International (2004), as well as PERF 
(2005), cite concerns regarding use of the device against individuals who are on drugs or 
experiencing excited delirium. They also raise concerns about positional asphyxiation, 
heart disease, and pregnancy (with IACP (2010) also citing concern over the latter two). 
Amnesty International (2007), PERF (2005), and IACP (2010) also raised concern with 
the device being used on children and the elderly. NIJ (2011) has also expressed 
concerns about the device being used on people with pacemakers and those who are in a 
state of excited delirium. In regard to dealing with vulnerable populations, Alpert and 
Dunham (2010) find that training should address methods other than the use of CEWs 
on vulnerable populations due to their increased risk of adverse effects, which are 
outlined below.  
Children and elderly. Children and the elderly are considered part of the 
vulnerable population mainly due to their weight, because their bodies are frailer, and in 
the case of the elderly, the higher likelihood of having heart related problems. McDaniel 
et al. (2005) have found that weight can play a role in the likelihood of ventricular 
fibrillation (VF), with those who are smaller being at a higher risk. Additionally, Vilke and 
Chan (2007) reported those with pacemakers or other forms of heart disease might be at 
risk of serious side effects.   
Drugs. Medical studies have addressed the role of drugs in cases where a TASER 
was used. Specifically they have experimented on animals to look at the effects this 
combination has on the heart. Research using swine has been one of the most common 
methods in studying the combined effects of the TASER and drug use. Chan and Vilke 
(2009) state that physiological makeup of pigs is such that they should be more sensitive 
to extreme electrical currents than humans and dogs. However, Webster (2009) states 
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that caution should be taken when analyzing results from swine studies because the 
swine are typically anesthetized, which may alter the effects of the CEW. Additionally, 
Vilke and Chan (2009) note that studies on animals typically involve small samples, thus 
limiting their statistical power and generalizability.  
In a study designed to replicate police citizen encounters involving suspects on 
drugs, Lakkireddy et al. (2006) injected swine with cocaine; they concluded that cocaine 
actually provided a protective factor from the occurrence of ventricular fibrillation (VF). 
What makes this finding so interesting is that cocaine is a common factor seen in TASER-
proximate ARDs (see White et al., 2012; White and Ready, 2009; Kornblum and Reddy, 
1991; and Strote and Hutson 2008). In another study, methamphetamine was given to 
sixteen sheep, and the sheep were then exposed to a CED four times for up to 45 
seconds each exposure. Again, no VF was observed (Ho, Dawes, Cole et al., 2009). 
Excited delirium. Excited delirium in the early stages manifests itself through 
becoming hypothermic, psychotic, and agitated, with varying degrees of violence (Ross, 
1998). Excited delirium can also be “broadly characterized by agitation, excitability, 
paranoia, aggression, great strength, and unresponsiveness to pain” (NIJ, 2011, p 21). 
PERF (2005) specifically states that officers should be aware of the increased risk of 
death in those who are on drugs or in a state of excited delirium. IACP (2010) also 
addresses excited delirium, by stating EMS should respond to the scene and transport 
subjects to a medical facility when they are in a state of excited delirium. 
Pregnancy. Mehl (1992) reported on a pregnant woman who was struck by a 
probe in the abdomen and one in the leg, followed by a reported miscarriage seven days 
later. One additional case of a miscarriage occurred in 2001 when a woman was 
subjected to a TASER. Amnesty International alleged that the lawyers in the case found 
“a likely causal connection between the fetal death and the electro-shock” (2007, p 60). 
While no medical research has been conducted in this area, TASER International warns 
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that the device should not be used on pregnant women due to the fall risk (see also 
Amnesty International, 2004). 
Mental illness. IACP (2010) states that mental illness can increase pain tolerance, 
thus reducing the effectiveness of the CEW and should be taken into consideration 
before using the device. PERF (2005) only states mental health personnel should be 
aware of CEWs. Medical research has yet to address the link between mental illness and 
TASER devices.  
Controversy #2: Effectiveness and Injuries. 
Overall effectiveness. Questions have also arisen regarding the effectiveness 
the TASER device in terms of subduing resistant suspects. White and Ready (2007) found 
the effectiveness to be around 86 percent and TASER (2006) found the rate to be 
between 80 and 94 percent. In their study, White and Ready (2007) found that in 31.4 
percent of the cases, resistance continued at some point after the TASER devices was 
used. In 17 percent of these cases the resistance occurred after the officer was able to 
gain control of the suspect; in 14.4 percent of the cases, the device was ineffective and 
the suspect was not incapacitated (White and Ready, 2007). Additionally, White and 
Ready (2007) found that the highest effectiveness rate (90%) occurred in cases that had 
the greatest potential for injury or death. Lastly, White and Ready (2007) found that in 
80 percent of the cases officers were satisfied with how the device performed.  
Effectiveness against the drug intoxicated and mentally ill. NIJ (2011) 
states that suspects involved in police use of force incidents are typically on drugs or 
mentally ill and are at a higher risk for complications and even death when compared to 
healthy human populations. NIJ (2011) goes on to state that individuals who are 
mentally ill or under the influence of drugs are likely to be more resistant to the effects 
of the TASER, even multiple discharges. While findings are mixed, the prevalence of drug 
intoxication in cases of those who are subjected to a TASER device has been well 
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documented (see Kornblum and Reddy, 1991; NIJ, 2011; O’Halloran and Lewman, 1993; 
Strote and Hutson, 2006; White and Ready, 2009; White et al., 2012); with a couple  
also noting the prevalence of mental illness (see White and Ready, 2009 and White  
et al., 2012).  
Injury reduction. In regard to injury reduction, Oleoresin Capsicum (OC) spray 
has been found to reduce suspect injury by 70 percent, but it has increased officer injury 
by 21 to 39 percent; alternatively, CEW use is linked to a 60 percent decrease in suspect 
injuries (Alpert et al., 2011). NIJ (2011) reports that CEWs, when used in accordance 
with proper policies, produce a decrease in suspect and officer injuries, and appear to 
have a lower risk for injury than other use of force methods. Alpert and Dunham (2010) 
find that nearly 70 percent of officer injuries occur as a result of hands-on control tactics. 
MacDonald, Kaminski, and Smith (2009) and Smith, Kaminski, Rojek, Alpert, and Mathis 
(2007) also reported reductions in officer injuries when CEWs were used, prompting the 
recommendation that agencies should consider using other CEWs in place of hands on 
tactics (see also NIJ, 2011). Meyer (2009) pointed out additional benefits of less than 
lethal weapons; that in standoff situations the early use of less lethal weapons might 
prevent the situation from escalating and requiring greater levels of force.  
Alpert et al. (2011) found that injury rates varied depending on the department 
in their study. Specifically, they found that injury rates to officers were between 10 and 
20 percent, and injury rates to suspects ranged from 17 to 64 percent (Alpert et al., 
2011). NIJ (2011) found moderate injury rates to be low, and that significant injury rates 
have been found in less than 0.5 percent of exposures. Alpert and Dunham (2010) cite 
injury reductions for suspects as being between 40 and 79 percent, and reductions for 
officers being between 3 and 93 percent; with the reductions for both suspect and officer 
varying depending upon the methodology used in the various studies. Bozeman et al. 
(2009) found that of the 1,201 subjects observed in their study, 99.75% suffered no 
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significant injuries from the TASER use. Strote et al. (2010) studied 1,101 subjects 
exposed to a CEW over six years, and they found only 26.8 percent were seen by an 
emergency room or medical provider. In one study that was inconsistent with the above 
findings, Terrill and Paoline (2012) questioned the safety of CEWs in regard to citizen 
injuries; they found there was an increased risk of injury to citizens. They suggested 
more research is needed before any decision can be made as to whether CEWs or 
another use of force would be most appropriate.  
Effects of extended duration and multiple exposures. In a study by Vilke 
et al. (2007) using 32 healthy law enforcement personnel, no clinically significant 
changes were observed in the personnel after a standard 5-second discharge. 
Additionally, Swerdlow, Fishbeing, Chaman, Lakkireddy, and Tchou (2009) failed to 
identify a link between TASER exposure and electrically induced VF. When looking at the 
effects of multiple and prolonged discharges from a TASER device, Vilke and Chan found 
that the effects were unclear (2007). In a review of several animal based studies, 
Kaminski (2009) found that VF only occurred when there were 15-20 discharges of the 
device, with fatalities rarely occurring. In a review of healthy human subject studies, 
Kaminski (2009) cites that VF was not induced when there were two to three five-second 
exposures, or in ten-second exposures where the probes were placed directly over the 
heart. White and Ready (2009) also found no relationship between number of exposures 
and fatalities. 
Several studies however seem to contradict these findings of VF not occurring. 
NIJ (2008) found that repeated or multiple exposures occurred in several TASER-
proximate ARD cases.  NIJ has stated that the risk of VF differs depending on how close 
to the heart the probes are located; i.e., the closer they are the more likely VF can occur 
(2011). NIJ cautions that if an individual who is exposed to a CEW falls face first, the 
pressure to the chest may actually cause further penetration of the probes (NIJ, 2011). 
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They have also stated that the subject may appear to be fine after having been exposed 
to the TASER with VF occurring after a short delay (from minutes to hours) (NIJ, 2011). 
NIJ also cites a study conducted by Denis et al. (2007) where prolonged exposure to 
CEWs led to rapid ventricular pacing and death in swine; thus prompting NIJ to conclude 
that prolonged discharges in humans may not be safe (NIJ, 2011).  
Finally, with regard to multiple discharges Alpert and Dunham (2010) 
recommend a limit on total discharges to 3 standard cycles totaling 15 seconds. They 
state that the officer should stop and evaluate the situation after each standard cycle to 
determine if the resistance is continuing (Alpert and Dunham, 2010). They argue that if 
resistance continues after one cycle that multiple cycles are not likely to produce 
different results; thus officers should be trained in transitioning to different force 
methods in order to restrain the subject (Alpert and Dunham, 2010). NIJ (2008) 
reiterated these findings, stating that repeated or continuous exposures to an actively 
resisting subject may not provide compliance, especially if they are on drugs or 
experiencing excited delirium. 
Secondary or indirect effects. Injuries proximal to TASER deployment may be 
secondary or indirectly related to the use of the TASER. For example, the use of the 
device in the presence of flammable materials may actually cause a fire due to the spark 
from the device; the risk of the subject falling from a steep slope or elevated surface 
may result in severe injuries; and the use of the device when a subject is in a body of 
water could result in drowning (NIJ, 2011). NIJ (2008) lists additional concerns that may 
place a subject at higher risk; they include, when the subject is in control of a moving 
vehicle, and when the subject is placed in restraints (i.e. handcuffs).  
 Controversy #3: TASER-Proximate Arrest Related Deaths. 
 
TASER as a cause of death. White et al. (2012) examined 392 TASER-
proximate ARD cases, using both media data and medical examiner reports. They found 
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that the TASER was implicated as the cause of death or a contributing factor in 45 cases 
based on media reports and according to medical examiner reports, the device was 
identified as the cause of death in two cases and contributing cause in 16 (White et al., 
2012). Strote and Hutson (2006) found the TASER was a possible or contributing cause 
of death in 27% of the cases examined. Ho et al. (2006) conducted a study using 66 
human volunteers to determine what, if any, detrimental cardiovascular or physiological 
effects would result from a standard 5-second discharge from a TASER and found no 
causal link between the TASER device and sudden death.  
The role of drugs, excited delirium, restraint, and the heart. Drugs, 
excited delirium, restraint, and heart problems are often seen occurring in TASER-
proximate arrest related death cases. Ross (1998) believes the co-occurrence of drugs, 
excited delirium and restraint may be due to the effect of cocaine on the body’s 
dopamine receptors, which can cause an increased risk of death in excited delirium 
cases. O’Halloran and Lewman (1993) looked at eleven cases where the subject was in a 
state of excited delirium when they were restrained. In seven of the cases the subject 
was under the influence of drugs, and in the remaining four the subject was mentally ill. 
The authors believe the actual mechanism for death was either fatal cardiac dysrhythmia 
or respiratory arrest, which came about as a result of an increase in oxygen demands 
and a decrease in ability to obtain the needed oxygen (O’Halloran and Lewman, 1993).  
White et al. (2012) found that drugs (most commonly cocaine and 
methamphetamine) were most cited as a primary or contributing cause of death (58%), 
followed by heart problems (41%), and excited delirium (28%). White and Ready (2009) 
also found that death was more likely if the suspect was under the influence of drugs; 
was emotionally disturbed or mentally ill; or was in custody or handcuffed. Additionally, 
drug usage was echoed in the findings of Kornblum and Reddy (1991) when they found 
the cause of death to be a drug overdose in 11 of 16 cases they examined. Strote and 
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Hutson (2006) conducted a similar study where they identified 75 cases, from January 
2001 to 2005, and obtained 37 autopsy reports. In short, they found the autopsies 
showed the following occurred or co-occurred: heart problems (54.1%); illegal 
substances (78.4%); and excited delirium (75.7%).  
In their report from November 2004, Amnesty International reported finding 65 
deaths in the United States since June 2001. They found drug intoxication; positional 
asphyxiation, as well as impairment from use of pepper spray; and multiple and 
prolonged TASER deployments were commonly occurring in TASER-proximate ARDs 
(Amnesty International, 2004). In five cases the coroners reported that the TASER 
directly contributed to the deaths, and this was in conjunction with other factors, such as 
“heart disease, restraint, and/or drug intoxication” (Amnesty International, 2004: 43). 
In regard to restraint, O’Halloran and Frank (2000) discussed twenty-one cases 
where the cause of death was ruled as positional asphyxiation. Of their twenty-one 
cases, all were restrained in the prone position with eighteen being handcuffed and the 
remaining three having their arms manually restrained (O’Halloran and Frank, 2000). 
With regard to method of restraint, PERF (2005) states that the method of restraint 
should not impair breathing.  
Hick, Smith, and Lynch (1999) discuss how metabolic acidosis has frequently 
been found in conjunction with drug use, especially cocaine, but has not been linked to 
restraint alone. They found that metabolic acidosis was associated with cardiac collapse 
after exertion and being restrained. Stratton, Rogers, Brickett, and Gruzinski (2001) 
found there to be several common factors that contribute to death while being restrained 
for excited delirium. These include stimulant drug toxicity, restraint asphyxiation, and 
death that was secondary to underlying heart problems or other chronic disease 
(Stratton, et al., 2001).  
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In September 2007, Amnesty International reported on 290 deaths in the United 
States and Canada (Amnesty International, 2007). This 2007 report reiterated much of 
their 2004 paper; additionally though, they did acknowledge that many of the commonly 
occurring factors in these cases have been seen in other sudden in-custody deaths where 
a TASER device was not used. Finally, they raised the fact that in a few cases the subject 
did not have underlying health issues and was not on drugs, but did collapse suddenly at 
the scene, and that this brings to light additional questions regarding the risks of CEWs 
(Amnesty International, 2007).  
Administrative Policy in Controlling Police Use of Force 
National Guidelines for TASER Use. In 2005 both the Police Executive 
Research Forum (PERF) and the International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP) 
released policy guidelines describing training, policy and use of Controlled Electronic 
Weapons (CEWs). IACP released an update in 2010. These guidelines were released as a 
response to the growing number of departments that were utilizing these devices and to 
provide guidance on their usage. Cronin and Ederheimer (2006) found that prior to the 
release of guidelines by PERF, law enforcement agencies had little guidance in regard to 
policy and operational decision-making involving the use of the TASER and other CEDs. 
Additionally, many concerns have been raised by advocacy groups regarding the 
potential to misuse and overuse these devices, as well as the potential harm they pose to 
subjects (Cronin & Ederheimer, 2006).  
PERF. PERF conducted a study in early 2005 examining the policies that were 
implemented by 74 different agencies (Cronin & Ederheimer, 2006). They also looked at 
118 deaths that occurred proximally to a CED deployment, as well as a comparison group 
of non-death cases (Cronin & Ederheimer, 2006). PERF used the results from this 
research, along with consultation from subject matter experts, to develop their 
guidelines. 
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Policy Recommendations. With regard to deployment, PERF (2005) states that 
caution should be taken when dealing with those who appear to be on drugs or in a state 
of excited delirium, as they are at a higher risk for sudden death. They caution against 
multiple cycles and state that after one cycle the officer should stop and evaluate the 
situation. They warn against multiple officers using the device on the same subject at 
once and encourage training to emphasize switching to other force options when the 
device is not providing results as expected. They state that the device should be used on 
active resisters or those exhibiting physical aggression. They note that the device should 
not be used against pregnant women, elderly or young, and the visibly frail, absent 
exigent circumstances. They also warn that the device should not be used on those who 
are handcuffed; when someone may fall from a height that would cause serious injury or 
death; that the device should not be fired at a subject’s head, neck or genitals; that it 
should not be used near flammable substances, including alcohol-based OC spray; or 
when someone is in control of a moving vehicle (PERF, 2005).  
After the device has been deployed, PERF states that the method of restraint 
must not impair the subject’s breathing, that all subjects should receive medical 
attention, and that subjects should be regularly monitored even after they have had 
medical attention. After the incident, PERF recommends that a supervisor should conduct 
an interview of the officer. They also state a use of force report should be completed and 
policy should articulate the required content of that report. They also note that 
consideration should be given to investigating outside the chain of command in death 
cases, and statistics should be kept on all incidents in which the TASER is deployed 
(PERF, 2005).  
IACP. The IACP released their original guidelines for TASERs and other CEWs in 
2005, followed by a revision in 2010. Their 2010 guidelines were released along with a 
revised Concepts and Issues Paper (IACP, 2010). As with the PERF policies, IACP’s policy 
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was developed after an extensive review of the literature on TASER and other CEWs. 
Below are details on their 2010 policy.  
2010 Policy Recommendations. The IACP specifically advises prohibiting the use 
of the devices on passive resisters and cautions against use of the device on those who 
are very young, pregnant, elderly, have a pacemaker, and those of small stature (IACP, 
2010). They also discourage the use of the device on those who are handcuffed or 
secured, unless they are exhibiting dangerous behaviors that cannot be controlled by 
another method. Regarding additional deployment concerns, the IACP specifically states, 
“No policy or guideline can anticipate every situation that officers might face. (2010, p. 
4).” Cases involving the use of a TASER, and in particular the death cases, are not 
routine police citizen interactions (see White et al. 2012, and White and Ready, 2009). 
Thus, IACP presents a list of concerns that should be considered if possible before 
deploying a CEW. These include: determining if the subject needs to be immediately 
incapacitated; whether or not the subject is mentally ill or under the influence of drugs or 
alcohol; whether the subject is in an area that poses a fall risk or is near flammable 
materials; whether officers can safely move within the required distance to deploy their 
CEW properly; whether more than one CEW will be deployed; and whether the subject is 
part of a vulnerable population (IACP, 2010).  
Training requirements are another key aspect that is addressed by IACP. They 
argue that training should be consistent with manufacturer recommendations as well as 
agency policy. They also list specific areas to be addressed, many of which revolve 
around the carrying, storage, operation of the device, post deployment actions regarding 
evidence, and medical evaluation (IACP, 2010). IACP also recommends role-play 
scenarios in order to test the officer’s decision-making capabilities. IACP states that re-
certification should take place annually and address the same aspects as the initial 
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training (2010). Finally, IACP states that a use of force report should be filed, and the 
department should clearly articulate what should be included in the report (IACP, 2010).  
In relation to medical attention, the IACP lists circumstances under which a 
subject should be transported to an emergency medical facility. These include: when a 
subject has been hit in a sensitive area (i.e. face, head, female breasts, or genitalia); 
when the officers experience difficulty removing the probes; when the suspect does not 
appear to be completely recovered within ten minutes post deployment; and with any 
subject who requests medical attention (e.g. officers should always ask subjects if they 
would like medical attention) (IACP, 2010).  
See appendix A for a policy summary table showing when the PERF and IACP 
policies have similar criteria and when one policy has specific criteria the other does not. 
The policies are broken down into five categories: awareness and training, deployment, 
post deployment, medical issues, and reporting. PERF has a greater number of guidelines 
and also tends to be more specific in their criteria for each guideline. IACP, however, 
provides greater detail with regard to force reporting and medical issues. For details and 
specifics on PERF guidelines see PERF (2005), and for IACP see IACP (2010).    
The importance of policy and use of force. There is a large body of 
literature documenting the effectiveness of administrative policy in controlling police field 
behavior. This literature provides an important backdrop for the current study. Walker 
(2006) highlights the importance of accountability and guidelines in law enforcement, 
and specifically that this can be achieved through administrative policies. Many studies 
have addressed the importance of administrative policy and their impact on the use of 
force, both lethal force and less lethal force. Alpert and Smith (1994) find that police 
policies are divided into categories based on their frequency and risk, with incidents 
involving the use of deadly force typically falling into the category of low-frequency, high-
risk. They state that incidents that fall into this category require specific policies, 
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procedures, and rules (Alpert and Smith, 1994). Other incidents, such as responding to 
misdemeanor domestic violence incidents cannot have strict policies applied to them, as 
the officer needs to be able to use their discretion when responding to such incidents 
(Alpert and Smith, 1994). In short, Alpert and Smith (1994) argue that the type of policy 
(strict versus guidance) needs to be based on the associated frequency and risk of the 
specific incidents.   
Use of deadly force. Prior to the Supreme Court ruling in 1985 in Tennessee v 
Garner, police were given great discretion in the use of lethal force to apprehend fleeing 
felons (Fyfe, 1988). In examining prior incidents Fyfe (1988) concluded that without clear 
guidelines on how to proceed in incidents where a firearm can be used, officers were left 
to decide on their own and the outcomes of such decisions were often unfavorable. 
Earlier, Fyfe (1979) found that by implementing clear, restrictive guidelines and 
procedures for the review of officer discretion in shootings, the New York Police 
Department experienced a substantial reduction in fleeing felon shootings and the use of 
warning shots. White (2001) noted that administrative policies could control the 
discretion taken by officers. White (2001) also found that, in the case of elective use of 
lethal force encounters, formal administrative policies could be overruled by the personal 
beliefs of the police chief and the informal culture of the department. Walker (2003) 
argues that discretion is controllable; specifically, he found that policies regarding use of 
deadly force have been able to reduce the number of officer shootings, and have bridged 
the gap between the number of blacks and whites that are shot and killed by officers.  
Less lethal encounters. Citing the work of Alpert and MacDonald (2001), 
Walker (2006) states that departments that require a supervisor to complete a use of 
force report have lower rates of use of force. Terrill (2003) examined the relationship 
between police use of force and suspect resistance; he found that in 12 percent of the 
cases suspects resisted in some form. He also found that the force used by officers and 
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resistance of suspects tended to be at the lower end of the spectrum, with verbal force 
by officers occurring in nearly 60 percent of all cases (Terrill, 2003). Additionally, Terrill 
(2003) found that when an encounter began with force, suspects tended to be more 
resistant and additional force was used later during the incident. Terrill (2003) argues 
that these findings lead to the questioning of the take-charge mentality during an 
encounter. This highlights the importance of policies regarding what the appropriate 
method of force is to be applied during a situation. 
Canine. The use of canines as a method of force to apprehend suspects poses 
some interesting issues. In order to understand how policies play a role in the use of 
canines, it is important to first understand the two methods in which canines are used by 
police officers. The first method is the “bite and hold,” where the dog is sent after a 
suspect and bites and holds them until their handler arrives (Mesloh, 2006). The second 
method of “bark and hold,” is where the dog is sent by the handler to seek out the 
suspect and keep them from fleeing until their handler arrives (Mesloh, 2006). Mesloh 
(2006) cites findings from the DOJ and IACP highlighting bark and hold as the preferred 
method since it results in fewer injuries.  
Hot pursuits. Hot pursuits have been considered a use of force, as officers are 
making a discretionary decision that can result in injury or death, for both officers and 
citizens (Walker, 2006). An analysis of hot pursuits conducted by Alpert and Dunham 
(1989) found that police policies regarding hot pursuits tend to fall into one of three 
categories: judgmental, where officers are allowed to make all major decisions regarding 
the pursuit; restrictive, where there are certain restrictions placed on the decisions 
officers can make; and discouragement, where the pursuits are discouraged with the 
exception of extreme cases. Based on an analysis of cases from the Metro-Dade Police 
Department, Alpert and Dunham (1989) find that a strong policy can reduce the 
prevalence of pursuit related problems. Walker (2006) states that policies that are more 
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restrictive tend to reduce the prevalence of pursuits in general as well as the potential for 
injuries, accidents, and deaths.  
Policies governing TASER usage. With the advancements in technology 
regarding less lethal weapons it becomes important that their policies advance as well. 
TASERs and other CEWs provide the potential to take suspects into custody without 
reliance on deadly force, where prior to their existence in many situations deadly force 
may have been the only option. While these devices clearly provide benefits, they also 
provide the potential for misuse and abuse (see Amnesty International (2007); Alpert 
and Dunham, 2010). Perhaps McEwen stated it best “The development and use of LTL 
(less than lethal) weapons must be held to an equally high standard, since virtually any 
weapon has the potential to inflict serious bodily injury if used inappropriately” (1997: 
39, “less than lethal” not in original). McEwen (1997) argues that a lack of clear policies 
may place departments at risk for injuries and death due to the inappropriate use  
of force.  
Having a policy alone is not enough; in order to reduce the risk of misuse the 
policies need to be understood by those that it applies to. McEwen (1997) states that the 
policy should be part of the initial training and annual training programs, as well as 
procedures regarding disciplinary action when needed. Alpert and Dunham (2010) 
provide training and policy recommendations with the purpose of reducing the misuse of 
CEWs. In regard to where the TASER should be placed on the use of force continuum, 
they suggest that in order to reduce injury it should only be used on actively resisting 
subjects (Alpert and Dunham, 2010). They also find that training that teaches officers to 
examine the entire situation is important (i.e. their ability to take a suspect into custody 
based on the situation and the capabilities and attributes of the suspect); this is argued 
as a rather important aspect because prior research has shown TASERs have been used 
against vulnerable populations with negative outcomes (Alpert and Dunham, 2010).  
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 Two key themes have arisen from the work of Alpert and Dunham (2010), 
Alpert et al. (2011), and Thomas, Collins, and Lovrich (2010) as they apply to TASER 
policy: placement on the use of force continuum and the importance of training. Alpert 
and Dunham (2010) conducted a national study on CED policies and training where they 
found no consensus across departments as to its placement on the continuum (Alpert 
and Dunham, 2010). As noted earlier, they found that 26% of agencies listed the device 
as a low level use of force, 64% as a mid-level option and 10% as a high level force 
option (Alpert and Dunham, 2010). Of the more than 500 agencies that participated in 
their study, Alpert et al. (2011) found that most agencies did have a use of force 
continuum, but the placement of the CED varied considerably as to when it was allowed.  
Thomas et al. (2010) asked departments to report on a scale of 1 to 10 where 
they placed TASERs on their use of force continuum. Their results indicate a mean of 5.6 
with a standard deviation of 1.5 (Thomas et al., 2010). While this method does provide 
standardization across departments, one must question what is lost in the translation 
from a department’s original use of force continuum to the 1 to 10 scale. Additionally, 
the authors note that research has shown a trend towards a more situation-based 
response system as opposed to the more traditional continuum (Thomas et al., 2010).   
Perhaps one of the most concerning findings regarding training came from 
Morrison (2009), who reported that training is not a common part of state authorized 
programs for small and medium departments. Thomas et al. (2010) reported similar 
findings; specifically, they found that the required initial training hours ranged from 2 
hours up to 24 hours, with a mean of 7.1 hours and a standard deviation of 2.6. Alpert 
and Dunham (2010) found an even greater range in initial training hours, from zero to 40 
hours, with most departments having either four hours (28.8%) or eight hours (46.6%). 
Thomas et al. (2010) did identify an association between reductions in the use of lethal 
force and greater training hours, as well as reductions for departments who placed the 
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device higher on the use of force continuum. The authors do note, however, that the 
content of the training may be of greater importance than the actual number of hours in 
training (Thomas et al., 2010).  
Thomas, Collins, and Lovrich (2011) conducted an extensive study comparing the 
policies of 124 different municipal police departments to the PERF (2005) policy 
guidelines for use of CEWs. They found that departments were generally not following 
the PERF guidelines. They also note that data collection occurred between 2008 and 
2009, nearly 3 years after the PERF guidelines were published (e.g., giving departments 
more than an adequate amount of time to amend their policies). Specifically regarding 
pre-deployment guidelines, they found that 53.69% of the guidelines addressed the 
policy aspects identified by PERF, 45.3% addressed PERF’s peri-deployment guidelines, 
and 78.23% addressed the post-deployment guidelines of PERF (Thomas et al., 2011). 
Thomas et al. (2011) conclude that all departments should have written policies that 
address the concerns surrounding CEWs, and that these policies should model those put 
forth by PERF. The conclusions from Alpert and Dunham (2010) and Alpert et al. (2011) 
are also consistent with many of PERF’s (2005) recommendations, specifically those 
regarding the target population, situational risk factors, number of activations, and 
medical evaluation. 
Conclusion 
 
Over the past decade, TASERs have become increasingly popular among law 
enforcement, with this trend being accompanied by substantial controversy. The 
controversy surrounding TASER devices has been ongoing for the past several years, 
with issues revolving around their proper use and the potential for fatal outcomes. Prior 
research strongly suggests that administrative policy can successfully control police field 
behavior and reduce negative outcomes. Current research on policies regulating the 
TASER shows substantial variation in several key areas. However, research has not 
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sufficiently explored whether the larger literature on the effectiveness of administrative 
policy extends to the TASER, and more specifically, whether the prevalence of cases 
resulting in death can be reduced through adherence to national model guidelines on 
TASER use.  
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Chapter 3 
Data And Methodology 
Study Sample 
This study examines departments that have experienced three or more TASER-
proximate ARDs and compares them to matched departments with two or fewer TASER-
proximate ARDs.6 Nationwide, there were a total of 17 departments that experienced 
three or more TASER-proximate ARDs between January 2001 and December 2008. They 
include: Phoenix Police, AZ; Harris County Sheriff, TX; Las Vegas Metro Police, NV; San 
Jose Police, CA; Chicago Police, IL; Jefferson Parish Sheriff, LA; Miami-Dade Police, FL; 
Orange County Sheriff, FL; Sacramento County Sheriff, CA; Birmingham Police, AL; Fort 
Worth Police, TX; Gwinnett County Sheriff, GA; Indianapolis Police, IN; New York Police, 
NY; Oklahoma City Police, OK; Sonoma County Sheriff, CA; and Los Angeles Police, CA. 
These represent the study departments. 
These 17 departments are not evenly distributed geographically across the 
country at the state level. Of the nine divisions that the US census uses, only seven 
divisions had departments with three or more TASER-proximate ARDs occurring within 
them. They include four in the Pacific, two in the Mountain, four in the West South 
Central, one in the East South Central, three in the South Atlantic, two in the East North 
Central, and one in the Mid-Atlantic; none occurred in New England or in the West North 
Central. More generally, there is a concentration of departments with 3 or more TASER-
proximate ARDs in the southern and western parts of the United States. Roughly two-
                                               
6 The cutoff point of three or more TASER-proximate ARDs was chosen based on the 
mean number of TASER-proximate ARDs for the departments identified in White et 
al.’s (2012) paper (1.32, with a standard deviation is .802). Departments with ARDs 
from .518 to 2.12 are within "normal" range (based on the population average).  
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thirds of the incidents occurred with local police departments and the remaining third 
with sheriffs departments. The number of full-time sworn officers for these agencies 
ranges from 218 to 13,466, with the exclusion of the New York Police Department, which 
has 40,435 full-time sworn officers (numbers according to BJS, 2008).  
Matched Sample 
The study departments were matched to other law enforcement agencies based 
on the number of full-time sworn officers in the department (within 20 percent when 
possible); the geographic location (at the state level when possible, then census division 
or region); and the type of department, (i.e. police or sheriff). Matching based on this 
criteria was carried out in order to best account for important departmental features such 
as budget, training capacity, and resources (as well as population served). The data on 
the departments and their number of full time officers were obtained through LEMAS: 
2000 Sample Survey of Law Enforcement Agencies (BJS, 2008). Lastly, only departments 
who utilize the TASER were selected. Every effort was made to determine the year of 
TASER adoption to ensure that each study department and its matched agency have 
been using the device for a similar amount of time. For those departments where the 
adoption years were determined, the adoption time periods matched up to within  
one year. 
Matching 
Of the 17 study departments, suitable matches were found for 14. The following 
departments did not have a reasonable match: Chicago, Los Angeles, and New York City 
Police Departments. Chicago and Los Angeles police did not have suitable matches 
because their most obvious matches—Detroit and San Francisco Police Departments, 
respectively—do not utilize the TASER or other CEWs. The New York Police Department 
did not have a suitable match due to the size of the department and the fact that only 
officers in the Emergency Service Unit are issued the TASER device (White and Ready, 
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2010). The administrative policy for the Birmingham Police Department (another study 
department) could not be obtained. With this being the case, Chicago, Los Angeles, New 
York City Police Department, and Birmingham Police Departments were excluded from 
the study.  
When matching the departments, there were six cases where the best or only 
suitable match had TASER-proximate ARDs. For two departments the matched 
department had four fewer TASER-proximate ARDs than its corresponding study 
department, two departments had three fewer, and two departments had only two 
fewer. Table 2 shows the study and matched departments. 
Coding 
The author contacted each of the study and matched departments by phone, 
mail, and email to obtain their use of force and TASER policies. In order to compare the 
policies of the study departments to those of the matched departments a baseline 
needed to be established for comparison. Thomas et al. (2011) compared the policies of 
metropolitan police departments on 23 aspects of the PERF (2005) policy 
recommendations. In their study, they used dichotomous variables to indicate whether or 
not the department’s policies matched PERF’s policy (Thomas et al., 2011). This study 
took a similar approach; however, departmental policies were compared to both PERF 
and IACP policy guidelines, and the author used a more nuanced ordinal ranking of 0, did 
not match at all; 1, partially matched; and 2, was a strong match to the policy guidelines.  
By using an ordinal ranking system of 0, 1, or 2, the author was able to capture 
the “middle ground” of policies that mentioned or dealt with a specific issue, but did not 
provide as detailed treatment as the national policy (PERF or IACP). An example will help 
illustrate. PERF has a guideline that states the device should be activated once, and then 
the officer should stop and evaluate the situation. If subsequent cycles are necessary, 
they should be restricted to the minimum necessary to take the subject into custody. In 
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this example a score of zero would be given if neither criteria were met (stop and 
evaluate, and limit the subsequent cycles). A score of one would be given if only one 
aspect of the criteria was met. A score of two would be given when both aspects of this 
guideline were met.   
IACP medical guidelines presented a more complex matter when assigning a 
ranking. The IACP guidelines give certain circumstances under which an EMT response or 
transport to a medical facility is needed, such as subjects who are part of a vulnerable 
population, are hit in a sensitive area, do not recover in reasonable time, are exposed to 
multiple discharges, or experience excited delirium. For example, policies that stated all 
subjects exposed to a device are to be treated by EMT or at a medical facility were given 
a score of two. When policies mentioned any of the above situations under which one 
should receive EMT response or transport to a medical facility, but did not specifically 
mention how medical attention would be given, a score of one was given. Finally, those 
that made no mention of medical treatment received a score of zero.  
Analysis 
A descriptive comparative analysis has been used for this study, as the goal is to 
determine whether policy differences may exist between departments with three or more 
TASER-proximate ARDs, and matched departments with few or no TASER-proximate 
ARDs.7 The policy of each study and matched department was compared to the IACP and 
PERF policies. Additionally a comparison of each matched set of departments was 
conducted to determine if any characteristics such as department type, number of full-
time sworn officers, or geographical location were related to the prevalence of TASER-
proximate ARDs.  
  
                                               
7 Every effort was made to place as wide a variation as possible between the 
numbers of TASER-proximate ARDs for study and matched departments. 
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Considerations and Limitations 
The first limitation to this study relates to the years from which the current 
policies of departments were created. In several cases, departments could not offer a 
definitive answer with regard to when the current policy went into effect. The possibility 
exists that the policies of some departments were from years after the study period of 
2001 to 2008, and that the policy examined here may not have been in effect during the 
study period. Policy years were known for twelve of the twenty-six departments used in 
the study. For the policy years that were known, nine policies were from 2009 and later, 
one from 2008, and two were from 2007. Every effort was made to determine what 
changes occurred to policies in their revisions; however, in some cases departments were 
unable to provide specific answers. Those with policies from 2007 were Phoenix and 
Indianapolis. In the case of Phoenix there were two TASER-proximate ARDs that 
occurred in 2007 and Indianapolis had one TASER-proximate ARD in 2008. With the 
exception of these six cases there is the possibility that departments may have altered 
their policies in a response to previous TASER-proximate ARDs, to more closely reflect 
the model policies of PERF or IACP, in order to prevent future TASER-proximate ARDs. If 
changes such as that occurred in any study department policies, they may not accurately 
reflect the policies that were in place during the study period (2001-2008). Nonetheless, 
the policies examined here do reflect the most up-to-date information publicly available 
for each of the study agencies. 
A second limitation also revolves around the policies; however, this limitation 
concerns departmental adherence to their own policies. Specifically, this study was 
unable to take into account the degree to which individual departments follow their own 
policies. It is possible that regardless of the policies outlined by a department, officers 
may act in a manner that is inconsistent with their department’s policies. If this was ever 
the case the number of TASER-proximate ARDs experienced by a department may not be 
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an accurate reflection of the department’s policies. For example, a department may have 
high compliance rates in regard to national policy guidelines, yet have multiple TASER-
proximate ARDs if officers are not complying with their department’s policies.  
The third limitation involves the response rates and the information that was 
obtainable from the study and matched departments. As noted previously, the policy for 
one of the study departments was unobtainable. Nearly every department contacted 
provided a copy of their policy; however, when asked specific questions such as the year 
of their policy, the number of training hours, when they first began using the TASER, and 
where on the use of force continuum the TASER was placed; many would either not 
respond, or said they did not know, or would state the information could not be 
disclosed. The lack of information regarding training hours and placement on the use of 
force continuum hindered the ability to draw conclusions regarding the impact of training 
hours and placement of the TASER on the use of force continuum. It is important to note 
that the lack of response to these additional questions was evenly dispersed across the 
study and matched departments. 
The fourth limitation in this study is that departments may have experienced a 
TASER-proximate ARD that was not captured in this study. In White et al.’s (2012) 
dataset there are a total of seven cases where the name of the department in which the 
TASER-proximate ARD occurred is unknown. Four of these instances occurred in 
California, two in Texas, and one in Illinois. This leaves open the possibility that matched 
departments in California and Texas may have more TASER-proximate ARDs than was 
originally thought. Additionally, it is possible that a department may have experienced a 
TASER-proximate ARD that was not captured in the White et al. (2012) study, though the 
authors of that study indicate that this is unlikely, given media coverage of ARDs, 
especially those involving the TASER.  
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The fifth limitation to this study is in regard to additional matching criteria. There 
is the possibility that the criteria this study matched on did not sufficiently capture the 
frequency at which the TASER is used by departments. Having had the numbers 
regarding arrest rates, types of arrests, calls for service that dealt with the mentally ill, 
and the number of TASERs in use by each department, or in an ideal world, the number 
of TASER deployments per department, this study would have been better able to match 
departments on frequency of TASER use. Thus, potentially producing more suitable 
matches, or at least emphasizing the strength of the matches used.  
The final limitation to this study is the small N, as this places a limitation on the 
statistical power of the study. While chi-square statistics have been calculated for the 
study, the generalizability of these results should be taken with caution as they are based 
on a sample size of 13 for the study departments and 13 for the matched departments. 
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Chapter 4 
Results 
The results from this study are broken down into three sections; key individual 
guidelines and total scores, category scores, and department comparisons. A compliance 
rate was calculated based on whether or not the PERF or IACP model guideline is 
covered in an individual department’s policy8. For each guideline there are a total of 
thirteen study and thirteen matched departments reporting, for a total of thirteen points 
distributed between the following categories: full compliance, partial compliance, and 
failure to comply. The number for each compliance category was then divided by thirteen 
to create the “compliance rate” for each guideline, which is presented in percentage 
form. For example, if ten study departments fell into the no category and three fell into 
the yes category, they would have a 77 percent failure to comply rate. When calculating 
the compliance rates for policy categories, the sum of compliance categories for each 
guideline in the category is taken and the percent for each compliance category is 
calculated based on the number of guidelines within the category. For example, if there 
were four guidelines in one category, for a total of 52, and the total for “no” in the study 
department was 37, there would be a 71 percent failure to comply rate, as 37 divided by 
52 is 71; for the same category if the total for yes was 11, there would be a 21 percent 
compliance rate, with the remaining four, or eight percent, being partial compliance. The 
same method is used for calculating the overall total and the department totals; 
however, with department totals only the failure to comply rate (not partial or full 
compliance rate) is shown for simplicity sake. 
  
                                               
8 It is important to emphasize compliance here is not in terms of whether or not 
officers comply with the guidelines; rather that departments themselves are 
complying by adhering to the national model guidelines.  
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Key Individual Scores and Total Scores 
Key Individual PERF scores. Table 3 shows individual guidelines from the 
PERF policy separated into five categories (training and awareness, deployment, post-
deployment, medical, and reporting). The first column shows the rate at which study 
departments correspond to the PERF guidelines (% and n) and the second column shows 
the same for the matched departments, with the last column reporting the chi-square p-
value. For the sake of simplicity, differences of 20 percent or more have been 
highlighted. For example, when looking at the optimum range of 15’ as a guideline in 
department policies there was an 85 percent failure to comply rate for the study 
departments; whereas matched departments were more likely to mention this PERF 
guideline in their policy, with a 54 percent failure to comply rate (a p-value of .089 
showed marginal statistical significance). Recognizing the limitations of the CEW and 
transitioning to another force method showed a 77 percent failure to comply rate for 
study departments, compared to a far lower 46 percent failure to comply rate for 
matched departments (a p-value of .024 indicated statistical significance). No 
deployment against those of a vulnerable population showed a 38 percent failure to 
comply rate for study departments and again a lower failure to comply rate of 15 percent 
for the matched departments (a p-value of .363 showed no statistical significance). The 
guideline regarding not using the device on those who are handcuffed showed there was 
a 46 percent failure to comply rate for study departments and a 23 percent failure to 
comply rate for the matched departments, again showing matched departments with 
lower failure to comply rates (a p-value of .223 indicated no statistical significance). 
Lastly, the guideline stating the primary mode of the device should be the probe mode 
showed a 69 percent failure to comply rate for study departments and a  
31 percent failure to comply rate for matched departments. This was the largest 
difference between study and match departments, and was marginally statistically 
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significant with a p value of .093. It is important to note that, while many guidelines 
were not statistically significant they were substantively significant.  
PERF Total Scores. The total failure to comply rate to the PERF guidelines for 
the study departments was 54 percent compared to 48 percent for the matched 
departments, shown at the bottom of Table 3. This is in the expected direction of the 
study departments scoring higher than the matched departments in the no category, of 
failing to comply with the policy guidelines; that is, they are less likely to include PERF 
guidelines in their own policies. Alternatively, the study departments again scored lower 
overall in the yes category, with a 35 percent compliance rate and the matched 
departments scoring a 37 percent compliance rate. Departments that have experienced 
three or more TASER-proximate ARDs are less likely than their matched counterparts to 
cover PERF’s model policy in their own policies. While these numbers show an 
association between adherence to PERF’s model guidelines and a lower number of 
TASER-proximate ARDs, a p-value of .240 indicated no statistical significance and that 
the association could have been due to random variation.  
Key Individual IACP scores. Table 4 mirrors Table 3 in format; however, it 
shows the findings for IACP’s model policy guidelines. Many of the findings from PERF 
were also found with IACP. For example, the probe mode being the primary method of 
deployment showed a 69 percent failure to comply rate for the study departments, 
compared to a far lower 31 percent failure to comply rate for the matched departments 
(with a p-value of .093 showing it was marginally statistically significant). The guideline 
outlining the concerns of using a CEW on those considered part of the vulnerable 
population showed a 46 percent failure to comply rate compared to a 23 percent failure 
to comply rate for the matched departments, but this difference did not reach statistical 
significance. The guideline regarding officer’s consideration for transitioning to another 
use of force when the CEW does not produce expected results showed a 77 percent 
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failure to comply rate for study departments compared to a far lower 46 percent failure 
to comply rate for the matched departments (with a p-value of .107). And finally, the 
guideline regarding the necessity of EMT response or transportation to the hospital when 
subjects failed to recover in a reasonable time showed study departments failing to 
comply 54 percent of the time and matched departments failing to comply 31 percent of 
the time  (with a p-value of .228 indicating this was not statistically significant).  
IACP total scores. The findings for the IACP total scores showed the difference 
between yes (compliance) and no (failure to comply) for both the matched and study 
departments’ totals were quite narrow, particularly with the matched departments; 
however, unlike PERF, the IACP scores showed marginal statistical significance (with a  
p-value of .073). Specifically, in the yes category the study departments scored lower 
with a 36 percent compliance rate, where the match departments had a 44 percent 
compliance rate. With regard to the failure to comply rate, the study departments scored 
48 percent, where the matched departments scored 46 percent. This was in the expected 
direction of the study departments scoring higher failure to comply rates, indicating they 
more frequently failed to meet IACP guidelines. As with the PERF totals, the IACP totals 
show those departments with three or more TASER-proximate ARDs are less likely than 
their matched counterparts to adhere to the IACP policy guidelines in their own policies. 
This again showed an association (in this case) between adherence to IACP policies and 
a lower number of TASER-proximate ARDs. With the failure to comply rates falling fairly 
close together for PERF and even more so with IACP, a look at the findings in terms of 
categories is warranted and presented below.  
Category Scores 
The guidelines set forth by PERF and IACP have been broken down into five 
categories: awareness and training, deployment, post deployment, medical, and 
reporting; with each category having varying numbers of guidelines within them. Table 5 
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and Table 6 in Appendix A reflect the category findings for the PERF and IACP guidelines 
respectively.  
PERF category scores.  
Awareness and training. The awareness and training category of the PERF 
guidelines is made up of six different guidelines. In this category the study departments 
complied six percent of the time, compared to a ten percent compliance rate for the 
matched departments. The study departments failed to comply 81 percent of the time 
compared to 67 percent for the matched departments. While the matched departments 
did slightly better than the study departments, overall both groups had high failure to 
comply rates for PERF’s guidelines in the category of awareness and training.  
Deployment. The deployment category for the PERF guidelines is made up of 
twelve different guidelines. While the numbers here are not dramatically different, they 
do show that the matched departments fare better in this category than the study 
departments. Specifically, the study departments had 47 percent compliance rate, while 
the matched departments had a 55 percent compliance rate. The study departments had 
a 40 percent failure to comply rate, where the matched departments had a 31 percent 
failure to comply rate.  
Post-deployment. The post-deployment category has only two guidelines and 
was the only category showing differences between the study and matched departments 
of 20 percent or greater. In this category the study departments had a compliance rate 
of 77 percent, while the matched departments scored a compliance rate of 54 percent. 
The study departments scored lower with a failure to comply rate of 19 percent, where 
the failure to comply rate for the matched departments was 31 percent. With the study 
departments performing better than the matched departments, the findings in this 
category are inconsistent with the PERF total scores.  
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Medical. For the four guidelines in the medical category, the compliance rate for 
the study departments was 21 percent, with the matched departments scoring 31 
percent. The study departments received a failure to comply rate of 71 percent and the 
matched departments received a 60 percent for their failure to comply rate. This shows 
overall both groups have not closely followed the PERF guidelines in this area; however, 
the matched departments did a stronger job of following PERF medical policies.  
Reporting. In the reporting category there were a total of six guidelines. The 
compliance rates in this category were 35 percent for the study departments and 26 
percent for the matched departments. The study departments scored a 53 percent for 
the failure to comply rate, and the matched departments received a 63 percent.  These 
numbers went against the total numbers for PERF, showing that the study departments 
tended to more consistently follow the PERF guidelines for reporting compared to the 
matched departments.  
In summary, there were two categories, post-deployment and reporting, where 
the study departments did not have higher failure to comply rates compared to the 
matched departments. Overall, the breakdown of PERF’s policy guidelines by category 
shows an association between departments with three or more TASER-proximate ARDs 
and higher rates of failing to comply with PERF policy guidelines in their departmental 
policies; however, it is important to note that none of the categories showed any 
statistical significance.  
IACP category scores.  
Awareness and training. There was only one guideline in the awareness and 
training category for IACP; that was that an initial training course was required for 
everyone who carries a CEW. There was a 92 percent compliance rate for the study 
departments and a 77 percent compliance rate for the matched departments. The failure 
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to comply rate for this category was quite low with eight percent for the study 
departments and 23 percent for the matched departments. 
Deployment. For the seven guidelines in the deployment category, there was a 
38 percent compliance rate for the study departments and 52 percent for the matched 
departments. The study departments had higher failure to comply rates at 49 percent 
compared to 35 percent for the matched departments. Again, these numbers do not 
differ greatly; however, they still show the study departments doing more of a poor job 
at following the IACP guidelines regarding deployment than their matched counterparts.  
Post-deployment. There was only one guideline that fell into the post-
deployment category, the removal of the darts. Specifically, the darts may be removed 
after the subject is restrained following procedures outlined in training. The numbers 
here were similar. The study departments received an 85 percent for a compliance rate 
in this category where the matched departments scored 77 percent in the yes category. 
The study departments scored an eight percent for their failure to comply rate, where 
the matched departments scored 15 percent. 
Medical. With nine different guidelines regarding when and how someone 
receives medical attention from either an EMT or at a hospital, the medical category had 
by far some of the most complex requirements. This complexity is the reason why many 
departments fell into the partial category. For example, the compliance rate for the study 
departments was lower at 30 percent compared to 38 percent for the matched 
departments. Study departments received a score of 27 percent for a partial compliance 
rate, where the matched departments received a score of 13 percent. The study 
departments in this case had a lower failure to comply rate of 43 percent compared to 
the matched departments 50 percent. The findings here are a result of many 
departments partially fulfilling the requirements for IACP guidelines. This typically 
happened when the policies did not specify how one received medical attention or when 
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one received medical attention. This was the only category showing a statistically 
significant difference (with a p-value of .021). With study departments scoring lower with 
their failure to comply rates and with their compliance rates compared to the matched 
departments, no conclusion can really be drawn as to which group of departments has 
done a better job of following IACP medical guidelines. 
Reporting. The last category of IACP guidelines is reporting, which had eight 
guidelines within it. The compliance rates were very close, 29 percent for the study 
departments and 30 percent for the matched departments. The study departments 
scored 63 percent for their failure to comply, where the matched departments scored 62 
percent. With the numbers being as close as they were it is hard to say that the matched 
departments were really any better than the study departments when it came to 
following the reporting guidelines created by IACP.  
With the exception of the awareness and training, and the post-deployment 
categories, study departments had higher failure to comply rates versus compliance 
rates, with the failure to comply rates ranging from 43 to 63 percent. There were three 
categories, awareness and training, post-deployment, and medical, where the study 
departments did not have higher failure to comply rates compared to the matched 
departments. As with PERF, the overall breakdown of IACP’s policy guidelines by 
category shows there is an association between departments with three or more TASER-
proximate ARDs and higher rates of failing to comply with PERF policy guidelines in their 
departmental policies.  
Study Departments Compared to Matched Departments 
PERF guidelines. When comparing individual departments, interesting findings 
emerged showing how little difference there was overall for the policies between study 
and matched departments. In five cases the study department scored a lower failure to 
comply rate on the PERF guidelines than the department they were matched to; they 
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included: Phoenix Police Department, Las Vegas Metro Police Department, San Jose 
Police Department, Orange County Sheriff Department (FL), and Gwinnett County Sheriff 
Department. There were eight study departments that received a higher failure to 
comply rate than the match department. These departments included Harris County 
Sheriff Department, Jefferson Parrish Sheriff Department, Miami-Dade Police 
Department, Sacramento County Sheriff Department, Oklahoma City Police Department, 
Fort Worth Police Department, Indianapolis Police Department, and Sonoma County 
Sheriff Department. For simplicity sake, the p-values for department pairs are shown in 
table 7 and are calculated based on no, partial, and full compliance; however, only the 
failure to comply rate in percentage form is shown. 
IACP Guidelines. The findings from the IACP guidelines were very similar to 
those from the PERF guidelines. There were six study departments who scored lower on 
their failure to comply rate for IACP policy guidelines compared to the departments they 
were matched to. These departments included: Phoenix Police Department, San Jose 
Police Department, Miami-Dade Police Department, Orange County Sheriff Department 
(FL), Gwinnett County Sheriff Department, and Sonoma County Sheriff Department. In 
seven cases the study departments scored higher on the failure to comply rates than the 
study department they were matched with. These departments included: Harris County 
Sheriff Department, Las Vegas Metro Police Department, Jefferson Parrish Sheriff 
Department, Sacramento County Sheriff Department, Oklahoma City Police Department, 
Fort Worth Police Department, and Indianapolis Police Department. In three of these 
cases they scored 20 percent or higher than their matched counterparts on the scores for 
failure to follow the IACP guidelines. The PERF and IACP findings both show study 
departments having a greater rate of failing to comply with national policy guidelines, 
and this again leads to the conclusion that there is an association between these 
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departments with multiple TASER-proximate ARDs and adherence to national policy 
guidelines.  
There were no clear patterns in regard to compliance rates with national 
guidelines across department type (sheriff versus police department), the department 
size, the geographic location of the departments, the year of CEW adoption by 
departments, or training hours. Overall the departments with multiple TASER-proximate 
ARDs had higher rates of failing to comply with PERF and IACP guidelines compared to 
their matched departments. While this again shows an association with increased TASER-
proximate ARDs and higher rates of failing to meet national policy guidelines, it remains 
important to note that the statistical significance is rather weak, which may be due to the 
small sample size.   
In short, study and matched departments were most compliant with four PERF 
guidelines. These included no use on subjects who were handcuffed, no deployment if 
the subject is at risk for falling, a supervisor should respond to an incident, procedures 
regarding removal of darts, and the supervisor should conduct an initial interview. 
Overall, study and matched departments consistently failed to comply with four PERF 
guidelines and three IACP guidelines. The PERF guidelines included recognizing the 
limitations of CEDs and transitioning to other force methods, optimum range, evaluating 
after one cycle, fleeing subject not being sole justification for use, and everyone should 
be monitored even after medical attention. IACP guidelines included medical attention for 
those exposed to three or more discharges and those exposed to multiple devices, and 
including in their report if more than three cycles were used. Lastly, there were five PERF 
guidelines and three IACP guidelines where study departments had at least 20 percent 
higher failure to comply rates. The PERF guidelines included CED limitations and 
transitioning to other force methods, no deployment on those of a vulnerable population, 
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monitored even after medical attention. The IACP guidelines included probe mode as the 
preferred mode, no use on vulnerable population, and medical attention for those who 
do not recover in a reasonable amount of time.   
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Chapter 5 
DISCUSSION 
Summary of Key Findings 
The goal of this study was to determine in what areas the departments with 
three or more TASER-proximate ARDs were less consistent with the national guidelines 
created by PERF and IACP, when compared to other departments of like size, 
geographical location, and department type that had one to two or no deaths. Several 
areas were addressed, including, individual guidelines, five general categories of 
guidelines, and the overall frequency at which departments followed guidelines.  
Study departments had at least twenty percent higher compliance rates than 
matched departments on four PERF guidelines. The study departments had higher failure 
to comply rates of twenty percent or more when compared to the matched departments 
in six different PERF guidelines. In regards to IACP guidelines they had higher failure to 
comply rates of twenty percent or more on four different guidelines. 
When looking at the categories, the study departments had higher compliance 
rates with PERF policies in the post deployment category and the reporting category. The 
study departments had higher compliance rates with IACP guidelines in awareness and 
training category and the post-deployment category. Study departments had higher 
failure to comply rates in three PERF policy categories including: awareness and training, 
deployment, and medical when compared to the matched departments. As for IACP 
guidelines, the study departments had higher failure to comply rates in the deployment 
and reporting categories when compared to the matched departments.  
While there were a few instances where the study departments showed better 
compliance rates compared to the matched departments, the overall results of this study 
showed an association between departments with three or more TASER-proximate ARDs 
and higher failure to comply rates with national policies. In the instances where 
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compliance rates were higher for study departments, I speculate that this may have 
occurred due to departments revising those aspects of their policies in order to reduce 
the potential for future TASER-proximate ARDs. Additionally, it is important to note that 
there was no statistically significant relationship between departments and PERF 
guidelines and only moderate statistical significance was found with IACP guidelines.  
Common Themes and Implications 
Guidelines. Consistency between PERF and IACP guidelines in regards to where 
study departments fell short was found in three areas: probe mode being the primary 
mode; the use of the device on vulnerable population; and the use of other restraint 
methods when the device is proving to be ineffective. These are critical areas that are 
often tied to abuse of the device. A lack of policy guidance in these areas makes this 
especially problematic. 
For example, by using the device in drive stun mode as opposed to probe mode, 
officers may be unnecessarily using the device on subjects. This goes hand in hand with 
not using other methods of restraint when the device is ineffective. If officers are using 
the device in drive stun mode, or in the probe mode, and not receiving the desired 
effects, yet continue to subject someone to the device, one can see based on prior 
research how this places subjects at a greater risk for potential fatalities. Specifically, 
Amnesty International (2007) raised concerns about the use of CEWs in drive stun mode, 
as this could lead to an increased potential for abuse of the device. Additionally, Alpert 
and Dunham (2010) also argued that CEWs are at risk for misuse or abuse due to  
their ease of use, and found that the only way to combat this potential abuse is  
through policy.   
Along with research on the misuse and or abuse of the device, research has 
found CEWs are often less effective or ineffective on those who are of a vulnerable 
population; specifically, those who are on drugs, mentally ill, or in a state of excited 
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delirium, thus, potentially causing an officer to use the device multiple times when there 
are no clear policies and training to dictate otherwise. Several studies have shown that 
these factors were often associated with death in cases involving CEWs; specifically, 
Kornblum and Reddy (1991); Strote and Hutson (2008); White and Ready (2009); and 
White et al. (2012) all found at least one of the previously listed conditions to be 
occurring in a substantial portion of the ARD cases they examined. Specifically, White 
and Ready (2009) suggested departments should adhere to national guidelines; in 
particular they call out the use the devices against those of a vulnerable population. 
These findings make it clear that in the years since these articles departments who have 
had multiple TASER-proximate ARDs have not changed their policies and heeded advice 
from researchers.  
Study departments also fell short in areas regarding medical treatment. 
Specifically, the PERF guideline states subjects should be monitored even after medical 
attention has be given. Monitoring after one has received medical attention should be 
seen as critical, as NIJ (2011) stated that a subject may appear to be fine for some time 
after being exposed to a CEW, yet VF could still occur minutes to hours after the 
exposure.  
The IACP guidelines recommend EMT response or hospital transport for those 
who either request medical attention or appear to be in need of medical attention. A 
failure to adhere to this guideline is highly problematic, as TASER-proximate ARDs can be 
seen occurring for multiple reasons, such as a fall causing a fatal head injury, heart 
attack, drug overdose, and excited delirium. The death of an Iowa man in 2008 may 
have been prevented had medical attention been given; 15 minutes after his release 
from jail following an arrest involving a TASER the man was found dead on the sidewalk 
in front of the jail. His death was apparently due to epilepsy (Des Moines Register, 
2008). Of the 392 cases in the White et al. (2012) study, there were over fifty where the 
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subject was not taken to a hospital. By providing proper medical attention in cases such 
as these there is a possibility that death may have been preventable.  
Past research on TASER-proximate deaths and areas frequently associated with 
these deaths can be easily linked to the four major areas where the administrative 
policies for study departments have had high failure to comply rates with national policy 
guidelines. This link clearly demonstrates the need for departments to enhance their 
administrative policies in such a way that they adhere to national policy guidelines. 
Departments with three or more TASER-proximate ARDs have an average overall 
compliance rate of 36 percent. They fail to meet key guidelines anywhere from 38 
percent of the time to 77 percent of the time, with an average failure to comply rate of 
55 percent; for all polices this rate is 51 percent. These rates are simply unacceptable, 
and demonstrate an association between failing to comply with national guidelines and 
increased rates of TASER-proximate ARDs.   
Department Findings. The comparisons of the individual study departments to 
the matched departments showed that study departments had policies that were less 
consistent with national policies more often than the matched departments. Specifically, 
San Jose Police Department, a study department, had the highest compliance rates (not 
shown in Table 7) with 50 percent for PERF and 58 percent for IACP, with Phoenix Police 
Department, another study department, not far behind at 47 percent for PERF and 58 
percent for IACP.  Jefferson Parrish Sheriff Department, a study department, had the 
highest failure to comply rates for PERF and ICAP, with 87 and 88 percent respectively.  
The study departments were a mix of sheriff and police departments, and are 
not concentrated in any one area of the country. With the exception of one department, 
Indianapolis Police Department, the five study departments who failed to comply with 
PERF and IACP guidelines at least fifty percent of the time were in the Southern region of 
the country. Two of the three matched departments were also in the southern region. 
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Departments with high compliance rates tended to be in the southwestern area of the 
country. Thus, there appears to be an association between area of the country and 
compliance with national guidelines.  
Study departments ranged in size from 218 to 2,626; with department size not 
appearing to play a role in whether or not departments had failure to comply rates over 
50 percent. Only three of the ten study departments with over 1,000 officers had failure 
to comply rates over 50 percent; whereas two of the three study departments with less 
than 1,000 officers had failure to comply rates over 50 percent. With such small samples 
it is difficult to say department size is playing a role in these findings. While there is no 
clear explanation for why some departments are doing a poorer job of following national 
guidelines, it is clear that overall all departments are doing a poor job, and those with 
three or more TASER-proximate ARDs are typically doing even worse.  
Overall Compliance. Overall, the majority of departments examined in this 
study did a poor job of following the national guidelines. There was only one study 
department, San Jose Police Department, and one matched department, Tulsa Police 
Department, which followed both PERF and IACP guidelines at least 50 percent of the 
time. The study and matched departments both did better overall following the IACP 
guidelines as opposed to the PERF guidelines. Specifically, the study and matched 
departments complied with PERF guidelines 35 and 37 percent of the time, partially 
complied 11 and 15 percent of the time, and failed to comply 54 and 48 percent of the 
time, respectively. For IACP the study and match departments complied 36 and 43 
percent of the time, partially complied 15 and 11 percent of the time, and failed to 
comply 48 and 46 percent of the time, respectively. The IACP guidelines as a whole 
tended to be more general than the PERF guidelines; this is likely why there was a 
greater consistency with the IACP guidelines over the PERF guidelines, as well as 
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moderate statistical significance for IACP guidelines and none for PERF. In general, these 
findings regarding high failure rates are consistent with Thomas et al. (2011). 
Implications 
The major implications from this study revolve not only around the study 
departments doing poorly; rather, that all departments overall had a high failure to 
comply rates for PERF and IACP policy guidelines. Departments nationwide, particularly 
those who have experienced multiple TASER-proximate ARDs would be wise to adhere to 
the PERF and or IACP guidelines to reduce the likelihood of future deaths. Walker (2006) 
stated the importance of accountability in law enforcement; specifically, that this can be 
achieved through administrative policies. White (2001) found that administrative policies 
could control an officer’s discretion in use of force cases. Walker (2003) found policies 
regarding the use of deadly force successfully reduced the number of officer-involved 
shootings. Clearly, research has shown that policies can be effective in altering the 
actions taken by officers; thus, it is reasonable to posit that stronger adherence to 
national policies may reduce the frequency of TASER-proximate ARDs.  
Additionally, every department in this study has failed to include in their policies 
a guideline, such as the one by PERF, that states departments should maintain statistics 
on the use of these devices. Kane (2007) argued that departments should collect 
comprehensive records of force incidents, and he specifically states that in doing so 
departments could determine what policies work and do not work. By departments taking 
such action, they can determine the individual policies and actions within their 
department that are causing issues. Based on the policies, departments themselves are 
not keeping track of how the device is used. With this being the case, it again becomes 
clear that law enforcement is not receiving the message of researchers. 
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Perhaps the most serious implications revolve around the most obvious issue: 
that these are arrest related deaths from a device that is designed to be less than lethal9. 
Deaths of this nature can have serious and long term consequences, such as law suits 
against the departments or individual officers; loss of respect and trust from citizens 
towards law enforcement; depleted morale in the department; and a general disruption 
within the community. These ramifications can be rather wide spread and are not likely 
to disappear overnight; thus, the serious need to reduce these incidents. There is much 
support showing that the implementation of the national policy guidelines across the 
board can reduce these incidents. Part of the job has already been done, the policies 
have been written and are based on strong research. History and research has shown 
policies can alter an officer’s behavior; all that is left is for departments to adhere to 
these guidelines. 
In short, there is an association between study departments’ failure to adhere to 
national policy guidelines and their higher TASER-proximate ARD rates; however, this 
relationship is not strong, as their matched counterparts also had high failure to comply 
rates, although not as high as the study departments. This is not to say that the policies 
are not impacting an officer’s use of the device on the street; they may very well have an 
impact on an officer’s decision to use the device as well as the manner the device is used 
in. Prior research has shown there are other aspects often associated with TASER-
proximate ARDs that are out of an officer’s control, such as pre-existing health issues and 
drug ingestion, which may lead to a suspect’s death regardless of the usage of the 
TASER-device. 
  
                                               
9 It is important to recognize that deaths in TASER-proximate ARD cases may be 
inevitable in some cases, regardless of the policies that are implemented. 
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Future Research and Next Steps 
Future Research. This study has laid the foundation for future research in 
several directions. First, a similar study could be conducted using a broader range of 
study and matched departments. In the past three years it is quite likely that the number 
of departments with three or more TASER-proximate ARDs has grown, thus making it 
feasible to broaden the number of study and matched departments, as well as to only 
use matched departments that did not have any TASER-proximate ARDs. This would 
provide greater generalizability and statistical power, as well as true comparison between 
those with no TASER-proximate ARDs and those with three or more.  
Second, an examination of the media reports for all the departments with three 
or more TASER-proximate ARDs should be conducted to determine exactly what national 
guidelines were not being followed during these incidents. By doing this one would be 
able to see exactly what national policy guidelines have been broken and how frequently 
they were broken. It is also possible that departments may not have always followed 
their own policies. Thus, an analysis of this kind would provide deeper insight into what, 
policy wise, was going wrong at the time of these fatal incidents. 
Third, future research should expand the study beyond ARD cases, to cases 
where serious injuries occurred proximal to a TASER arrest. While an ARD is certainly 
more troubling than injury cases, many of the same issues may arise when a department 
has multiple incidents involving a TASER that result in serious injury. For instance, 
lawsuits may still be an issue, as well as loss of respect for law enforcement by the 
community, and depleted morale within the department. All of which again, could be 
reduced by the implementation of proper policies. 
Fourth, future research should examine the enforcement and disciplinary aspects 
surrounding administrative policy. In some instances, it may be that a department has 
adhered to the national guidelines regarding CEW usage, yet these guidelines are not 
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being adequately enforced. By examining how departmental policies are enforced and 
the repercussions of not following guidelines, research may show that the problem does 
not lie solely with the adherence to policies; rather, the problem is deeper and includes 
enforcement of administrative policies within the department (e.g. accountability 
problems).  
  Next Steps. This study has shown that the larger issue may very well be that 
many law enforcement agencies are not open to or aware of advice that originates 
outside their department. With national policy guidelines being met roughly half the time 
at best, and vast amounts of prior research from a variety of disciplines not being 
heeded, it appears as though the departments are not looking externally for advice on 
how to best operate. While it is clear steps need to be taken to achieve higher 
compliance rates for departments nationwide, exactly how to do this is unclear.  
Should the approach be taken at a national level, where all departments who 
wish to utilize a TASER must adhere to a specific set of guidelines and undergo specific 
training? Perhaps, in order to receive POST or CALEA accreditation departments must 
meet certain guidelines regarding the usage of TASERs. These directions may be more 
drastic than what is really needed; perhaps, an awareness campaign targeting law 
enforcement agencies, combined with regional training events and conferences would be 
enough. By specifically showing agencies that research has shown the association 
between weak administrative policies governing TASER usage and higher rates of TASER-
proximate ARDs, we may be able to make departments aware of the benefits of following 
national guidelines regarding the use of TASERs and other CEWs. 
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Table 1. Policy Summary  
 
Policy PERF IACP 
Awareness and Training    
At risk population X X 
Aware of Excited Delirium X  
Initial Training  X 
Training recertification X X 
Risk of multi and continuous cycles X  
CED limitations, transition to other force X X 
Optimum 15’ X  
Training audit X  
Deployment   
Deploy only on active resistance X X 
One officer deployment at time X  
Evaluate after one standard cycle X  
Subject may not be able to respond  X 
Minimize number of deployments X X 
Fleeing subject not sole justification X  
Concerns with use against vulnerable population  X 
No Deployment against vulnerable population X  
No use on handcuff X X 
No deployment if fall risk X X 
Avoid sensitive areas X  
No deployment near flammable material X X 
Probe mode primary X X 
No deployment when in moving vehicle X  
Deployment warning  X  
Post Deployment   
Supervisor should respond to incident X  
Dart removal X X 
Medical   
Restraint should not impair breathing X  
Medical contacted if CED is anticipated X  
All receive medical X  
Medical attention under certain criteria  X 
All should be monitored even after medical X  
Reporting   
Supervisor conduct initial review X  
All incident reported in report X X 
Investigate outside chain of command X  
Details on what to include in report X X 
Stats maintained X  
Details on what to include in statistics X  
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Table 3. PERF Individual Policies 
PERF    % (N) Study 
Department 
Matched 
Department 
  p 
Training and Awareness    
Aware of Excited 
Delirium 
No 
Partially 
Yes 
77 (10) 
15 (2) 
8 (1) 
69 (9) 
15 (2) 
15 (2) 
.824 
Training 
recertification 
No 
Partially 
46 (6) 
54 (7) 
31 (4) 
69 (9) 
.420 
Risk of multi and 
continuous cycles 
No 100 (13) 100 (13)  
CED limitations, 
transition to other 
force  
No 
Partially 
Yes 
77 (10) 
8 (1) 
15 (2) 
46 (6) 
54 (7) 
0 (0) 
.024 
Optimum 15’  No 
Yes 
85 (11) 
15 (2) 
54 (7) 
46 (6) 
.089 
Training audit No 100 (13) 100 (13)  
Deployment    
Deploy only on 
active resistance 
No 
Partially 
Yes 
0 (0) 
15 (2) 
85 (11) 
8 (1) 
0 (0) 
92 (12) 
.218 
One officer 
deployment at 
time 
No 
Partially 
Yes 
69 (9) 
8 (1) 
23 (3) 
62 (8) 
8 (1) 
31 (4) 
.904 
Evaluate after one 
standard cycle  
No 
Partially 
Yes 
55 (7) 
8 (1) 
38 (5) 
38 (5) 
46 (6) 
15 (2) 
.075 
Fleeing subject 
not sole 
justification 
No 
Yes 
54 (7) 
46 (6) 
77 (10) 
23 (3) 
.216 
No Deployment 
against vulnerable 
population 
No 
Partially 
Yes 
38 (5) 
46 (6) 
15 (2) 
15 (2) 
54 (7) 
31 (4) 
.363 
No use on 
handcuff 
No 
Partially 
Yes 
46 (6) 
8 (1) 
46 (6) 
23 (3) 
0 (0) 
77 (10) 
.223 
No deployment  
if fall risk 
No 
Partially 
Yes 
38 (5) 
8 (1) 
54 (7) 
15 (2) 
0 (0) 
85 (11) 
.204 
Avoid sensitive 
areas 
No 
Partially 
Yes 
23 (3) 
8 (1) 
69 (9) 
23 (3) 
8 (1) 
69 (9) 
1.00 
No deployment  
in vicinity of 
flammable 
material 
No 
Partially 
Yes 
23 (3) 
15 (2) 
62 (8) 
8 (1) 
15 (2) 
77 (10) 
.543 
Probe mode 
primary  
No 
Partially 
Yes 
69 (9) 
0 (0) 
31 (4) 
31 (4) 
15 (2) 
54 (7) 
.093 
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No deployment 
when in moving 
vehicle 
No 
Partially 
Yes 
38 (5) 
15 (2) 
46 (6) 
46 (6) 
8 (1) 
48 (6) 
.809 
Deployment 
warning  
No 
Partially 
Yes 
31 (4) 
15 (2) 
54 (7) 
31 (4) 
8 (1) 
62 (8) 
.819 
Post 
Deployment 
    
Supervisor should 
respond to 
incident 
No 
Partially 
Yes 
31 (4) 
0 (0) 
69 (9) 
38 (5) 
15 (2) 
46 (6) 
.258 
Dart removal No 
Partially 
Yes 
8 (1) 
8 (1) 
85 (11) 
23 (3) 
15 (2) 
68 (8) 
.405 
Medical     
Restraint should 
not impair 
breathing 
No 
Partially 
Yes 
77 (10) 
8 (1) 
15 (2) 
62 (8) 
15 (2) 
23 (3) 
.685 
Medical contacted 
if CED is 
anticipated 
No 
Partially 
Yes 
92 (12) 
8 (1) 
0 (0) 
92 (12) 
0 (0) 
8 (1) 
.368 
All receive medical No 
Yes 
38 (5) 
62 (8) 
38 (5) 
62 (8) 
1.00 
All should be 
monitored even 
after medical 
No 
Partially 
Yes 
77 (10) 
15 (2) 
8 (1) 
46 (6) 
23 (3) 
31 (4) 
.223 
Reporting     
Supervisor 
conduct initial 
review  
No 
Partially 
Yes 
0 (0) 
15 (2) 
85 (11) 
46 (6) 
0 (0) 
54 (7) 
.012 
All incident 
reported in report 
No 
Yes 
0 (0) 
100 (13) 
8 (1) 
92 (12) 
.308 
Investigate 
outside chain of 
command 
No 
Partially 
Yes 
85 (11) 
8 (1) 
8 (1) 
100 (13) 
0 (0) 
0 (0) 
.338 
Details on what to 
include in report 
No 
Partially 
Yes 
31 (4) 
54 (7) 
15 (2) 
23 (3) 
69 (9) 
8 (1) 
.696 
Stats maintained No 100 (13) 100 (13)  
Details on what to 
include in statistics 
No 100 (13) 100 (13)  
Total 
 
No 
Partially 
Yes 
54 (209) 
11 (44) 
35 (137) 
48 (189) 
15 (57) 
37 (144) 
.240 
 
Bold numbers indicate a 20% or greater difference between matched and study 
department.  
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Table 4. IACP Individual Policies 
IACP                              % (N) Study 
Department 
Matched 
Department 
  p 
Awareness and Training    
Initial Training No 
Yes 
8 (1) 
92 (12) 
23 (3) 
77 (10) 
.277 
 
Subject 
Resistance 
No 
Partially 
Yes 
0 (0) 
15 (2) 
85 (11) 
8 (1) 
0 (0) 
92 (12) 
.218 
Probe Mode 
Preferred 
 
No 
Partially 
Yes 
69 (9) 
0 (0) 
31 (4) 
31 (4) 
15 (2) 
54 (7) 
.093 
When not to use No 
Partially 
Yes 
15 (2) 
38 (5) 
46 (6) 
8 (1) 
31 (4) 
62 (8) 
.694 
Use on Vulnerable 
Population 
No 
Partially 
Yes 
46 (6) 
15 (2) 
38 (5) 
23 (3) 
23 (3) 
54 (7) 
.465 
Deployment 
Duration 
No 
Partially 
Yes 
38 (5) 
15 (2) 
46 (6) 
38 (5) 
23 (3) 
38 (5) 
.865 
Ability to respond No 
Yes 
100 (13) 
0 (0) 
92 (12) 
8 (1) 
.308 
Other restraint 
methods  
No 
Yes 
77 (10) 
23 (3) 
46 (6) 
54 (7) 
.107 
Post 
Deployment 
    
Dart removal  
 
No 
Partially 
Yes 
8 (1) 
8 (1) 
85 (11) 
15 (2) 
8 (1) 
77 (10) 
.827 
Medical     
Subject Requests 
medical attention 
No 
Partially 
Yes 
54 (7) 
15 (2) 
31 (4) 
38 (5) 
15 (2) 
46 (6) 
.693 
Subject hit in 
sensitive area 
No 
Partially 
Yes 
8 (1) 
23 (3) 
69 (9) 
15 (2) 
23 (3) 
62 (8) 
.822 
Officer has 
difficulty 
removing probes 
No 
Partially 
Yes 
38 (5) 
23 (3) 
38 (5) 
46 (6) 
8 (1) 
46 (6) 
.554 
No recover in 
reasonable time 
No 
Partially 
Yes 
54 (7) 
31 (4) 
15 (2) 
31 (4) 
23 (3) 
46 (6) 
.228 
Part of sensitive 
population 
No 
Partially 
Yes 
54 (7) 
23 (3) 
23 (3) 
62 (8) 
8 (1) 
31 (4) 
.546 
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Exposed to 3 or 
more discharges 
No 
Partially 
Yes 
38 (5) 
31 (4) 
31 (4) 
62 (8) 
8 (1) 
31 (4) 
.288 
Exposed to 
multiple devices 
No 
Partially 
Yes 
46 (6) 
38 (5) 
15 (2) 
69 (9) 
8 (1) 
23 (3) 
.177 
Belief exposed to 
15 plus seconds 
No 
Partially 
Yes 
46 (5) 
46 (5) 
23 (3) 
69 (9) 
8 (1) 
23 (3) 
.149 
Exhibits signs of 
Excited Delirium 
No 
Partially 
Yes 
54 (7) 
23 (3) 
23 (3) 
54 (7) 
15 (2) 
31 (4) 
.842 
Reporting    
Photographs No 
Yes 
38 (5) 
62 (8) 
38 (5) 
62 (8) 
1.00 
Evidence No 
Partially 
Yes 
31 (4) 
38 (5) 
31 (4) 
38 (5) 
38 (5) 
23 (3) 
.881 
Notify Supervisor 
and complete use 
of force report 
No 
Partially 
Yes 
0 (0) 
15 (2) 
85 (11) 
8 (1) 
23 (3) 
69 (9) 
.497 
Used in drive stun No 
Partially 
Yes 
77 (10) 
8 (1) 
15 (2) 
77 (10) 
8 (1) 
15 (2) 
1.00 
More than 3 
cycles 
No 
Yes 
85 (11) 
15 (2) 
69 (9) 
31 (4) 
.352 
More then 15 
seconds 
No 
Yes 
92 (12) 
8 (1) 
92 (11) 
8 (2) 
.539 
More than one 
ECW used 
No 
Yes 
92 (12) 
8 (1) 
92 (12) 
8 (1) 
1.00 
Sensitive 
population 
No 
Yes 
92 (12) 
8 (1) 
85 (11) 
15 (2) 
.539 
Total 
 
No 
Partially 
Yes 
48 (163) 
15 (52) 
36 (123) 
46 (155) 
11 (36) 
43 (147) 
.073 
 
Bold numbers indicate a 20% or greater difference between matched and study 
department.  
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Table 5. PERF Category Scores 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Bold numbers indicate a 20% or greater difference between matched and study 
department. 
 
 
Table 6. IACP Category Scores 
 
IACP% (N) Study 
Department 
Matched 
Department 
   p 
Awareness and 
Training Total 
 
 No 
Partially 
Yes 
8 (1) 
0 (0) 
92 (12) 
23 (3) 
0 (0) 
77 (10) 
.554 
Deployment 
Total 
 
 No 
Partially 
Yes 
49 (45) 
12 (11) 
38 (35) 
35 (32) 
13 (12) 
52 (47) 
.136 
Post 
Deployment 
Total  
 No 
Partially 
Yes 
8 (1) 
8 (1) 
85 (11) 
15 (2) 
8 (1) 
77 (10) 
.826 
Medical Total 
 
 No 
Partially 
Yes 
43 (50) 
27 (32) 
30 (35) 
50 (58) 
13 (15) 
38 (44) 
.021 
Reporting Total 
 
 No 
Partially 
Yes 
63 (66) 
8 (8) 
29 (30) 
62 (64) 
9 (9) 
30 (31) 
.948 
 
Bold numbers indicate a 20% or greater difference between matched and study 
department.  
PERF              % (N) Study 
Department 
Matched 
Department 
  p 
Awareness and 
Training Total 
 
 No 
Partially 
Yes 
81 (63) 
13 (10) 
6 (5) 
67 (52) 
23 (18) 
10 (8) 
.133 
Deployment 
Total 
 
 No 
Partially 
Yes 
40 (63) 
12 (19) 
47 (74) 
31 (49) 
13 (21) 
55 (86) 
.253 
Post 
Deployment 
Total 
 No 
Partially 
Yes 
19 (5) 
4 (1) 
77 (20) 
31 (8) 
15 (4) 
54 (14) 
.169 
Medical Total 
 
 No 
Partially 
Yes 
71 (37) 
8 (4) 
21 (11) 
60 (31) 
10 (5) 
31 (16) 
.457 
Reporting Total 
 
 No 
Partially 
Yes 
53 (41) 
13 (10) 
35 (27) 
63 (49) 
12 (9) 
26 (20) 
.405 
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Table 7. Comparison of Study/Matched Department’s Failure to Comply Rate  
 
   PERF  
%           p 
IACP 
%           p  
Depts. 1 Phoenix Police  Study 33 .274 35 .382 
San Diego Police  Matche
d 
47  50 
Depts. 2 Harris County Sheriff Study 53 .351 55 .244 
Dallas Police Matche
d 
37  46 
Depts. 3 Las Vegas Police Study 37 .178 58 .351 
Orange County Sheriff (CA) Matche
d 
43 38 
Depts. 4 San Jose Police Study 43 .003 31 .147 
Seattle Police Matche
d 
80 58 
Depts. 5 Jefferson Parrish Sheriff Study 87 .031 88 .012 
East Baton Rouge Parish Sheriff Matche
d 
70 54 
Depts. 6 Miami-Dade Police Study 47 .555 42 .691 
Jacksonville Sheriff Matche
d 
37 50 
Depts. 7 Orange County Sheriff (FL) Study 30 .127 46 .469 
Miami Police Matche
d 
47 54 
Depts. 8 
 
Sacramento County Sheriff Study 57 .297 35 .362 
Riverside County Sheriff Matche
d 
37 19 
Depts. 9 Oklahoma City Police Study 70 .000 50 .004 
Tulsa Police  Matche
d 
17 35 
Depts. 10 Fort Worth Police Study 50 .059 50 .350 
Austin Police Matche
d 
47 31 
Depts. 11 Gwinnett County Sheriff Study 70 .951 35 .018 
Greenville County Sheriff Matche
d 
73 73 
Depts. 12 Indianapolis Police Study 70 .259 77 .040 
Cincinnati Police Matche
d 
53 46 
Depts. 13 Sonoma County Sheriff Study 50 .341 27 .010 
Stanislaus County Sheriff Matche
d 
43 58 
Bold numbers indicate a 20% or greater difference between matched and study 
department 
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APPENDIX B 
ACRONYMS 
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ARD Arrest Related Death 
BJS Bureau of Justice Statistics 
CALEA Commission on Accreditation for Law Enforcement 
CED Conducted Energy Device 
CEW Controlled Electrical Weapon 
DOJ Department of Justice 
ECD Electronic Control Devices 
EMS Emergency Medical Services 
EMT Emergency Medical Technician 
GAO Government Accountability Office 
IACP International Association of Chiefs of Police 
LEMAS Law Enforcement Management and Administrative Statistics 
LTL Less Than Lethal 
NIJ National Institute of Justice 
OC Spray Oleoresin Capsicum Spray 
PD Police Department 
PERF Police Executive Research Forum 
POST Peace Officer Standards and Training 
TASER Thomas A Swift Electric Rifle 
VF Ventricular Fibrillation 
 
 
 
 
